46 Apache OFBiz Flaws Closed in 24.09.08: CVE-2026-83542 Works With No Login, Update Today

Direct answer: Apache OFBiz 24.09.08 closes 46 CVEs. 12 CVEs work with no login, including CVE-2026-83542, which runs code on the server. Today, check the version, update to 24.09.08, set new secret keys, then close the back office from the internet.

CISA gives CVSS 3.1 9.8 to CVE-2026-83542 and CVE-2026-82907. Apache itself gives no score. All releases before 24.09.08 are affected, including the old 18.12 line.

Main condition: people outside your office can open your OFBiz back office pages, for example /webtools or /partymgr. Limit: this article has no payloads, attack code, or attack sequence.

We read the Apache OFBiz CVE announcement, the Apache OFBiz security page, the release notes for 24.09.08, the OFBiz download page, the CVE-2026-83542 record, the CVE-2026-82907 record, the CVE-2026-105330 record, and CISA KEV on 6 November 2026, from 06.35 to 07.00 WIB. We tested 3 check scripts in a podman pod with the official OFBiz Docker image 24.09.07 and 24.09.08, plus an nginx 1.29 rule. We did not test a build from zip, MySQL, PostgreSQL, multitenant, REST, or an attack.

The problem: an open OFBiz back office can be taken over with no login

OFBiz keeps orders, stock, accounting, and staff data on 1 server, so 1 flaw opens all of that data.

Apache OFBiz is an open source ERPERPOne system that keeps the sales, purchasing, stock, and finance of a company in one set of data.AI-native ERP build. Businesses use OFBiz for catalogs, orders, warehouses, accounting, and HR. Many installs open the back office pages to the internet so that staff can work outside the office.

The 24.09.08 zip has been on the Apache download server since 2 November 2026. The announcement of the 46 CVEs came out on 4 November 2026 at 16.13 UTC, and the CVE records came out on 5 November 2026.

3 earlier OFBiz flaws went on CISA KEV in 2024 and 2025. So attackers already know this product and already have tools to find it.

How it works: advisory summary

This part uses the official summary from the CVE records. It helps you pick the right steps. It does not explain how to attack.

Summary of CVE-2026-83542

According to the CVE-2026-83542 record, an attacker with no login can make OFBiz load a screen definition from a file that the attacker sends. OFBiz then runs a Groovy expression on the server when it renders the page. The CVE record says that the same path also exists on 1 other public page, not only on the login page.

Summary of CVE-2026-82907

According to the CVE-2026-82907 record, the externalLoginKey value works before OFBiz checks the login and CSRF. The value is not bound to 1 browser, does not expire, and can be used again. A person who captures 1 value gets a full session as that user in all OFBiz webapps.

12 CVEs that work with no login

CVE	Impact with no login	CVSS 3.1
CVE-2026-83542	Code execution through the login page	9.8 (ADP)
CVE-2026-68524	Code execution: OFBiz loads a screen definition from an attacker location	Not scored yet
CVE-2026-73578	Login bypass through saved-view, code execution impact	Not scored yet
CVE-2026-82907	A captured externalLoginKey gives a full session	9.8 (ADP)
CVE-2026-73577	Login bypass through a path suffix	Not scored yet
CVE-2026-92887	REST operations with no auth attribute open with no login	Not scored yet
CVE-2026-105330	The old default JWT key gives admin access	Not scored yet
CVE-2026-109928	A password reset token gives a full session	Not scored yet
CVE-2026-114277	Janrain social login binds the wrong account	Not scored yet
CVE-2026-73580	HR organization and employee data leaks	Not scored yet
CVE-2026-83538	HR, catalog, and order data leaks	Not scored yet
CVE-2026-81815	SQL injection, only MySQL and MariaDB	Not scored yet

The groups in the table and the diagram come from the advisory titles, made by Rama Digital. Most of the 34 other CVEs need an account, often a view-only account. Examples: 7 code execution CVEs and 16 access CVEs that can change prices, orders, or balances.

Exploitation status on 6 November 2026

We found no attack reports, no public attack code, and no CISA KEV entry for these 46 CVEs. Rama Digital analysis: the OFBiz patches are open on GitHub with PR numbers on the Apache OFBiz security page, so attackers can read the code changes. Treat this release as urgent.

Who is most at risk

The risk depends on who can open the back office, the database type, and the upgrade history, not only on the version.

OFBiz server condition	Risk	Reason
The back office opens from the internet with no VPN	Highest	12 CVEs with no login, including code execution
MySQL or MariaDB database	High	CVE-2026-81815 is SQL injection with no login on these 2 databases
Upgraded from a release before 24.09.06, with security.internal.sso.enabled=true	High	CVE-2026-105330: the old default JWT key gives admin access
Many staff, partner, or customer accounts	Check	23 CVEs need an account, often with view permission only
Multitenant or the REST plugin	Check	CVE-2026-74841, CVE-2026-84728, and CVE-2026-92887 apply only to these features
VPN only and already on 24.09.08	Low	Still look for signs from before the update

Flaws in business systems that keep customer data also show up in online shops, for example in the Magento PolyShell CVE-2026-48356 warning. Database panels with business data also need a check, see the pgAdmin 4 CVE-2026-116241 warning.

Vulnerable and safe versions

What counts is the OFBiz version that runs and the origin of the configuration files, not the Java or operating system version.

Version	Install	Status on 6 November 2026	Action
24.09.01 sampai 24.09.07	Zip, git, or Docker image	Vulnerable, 46 CVEs	Update to 24.09.08 today
18.12.19 and older	Old line	No patch	Move to 24.09.08. Until then, step 4
Upgraded from a release before 24.09.06	Old security.properties kept	The JWT key can be the old default	After the update: ./gradlew rotateSecretKeys
Official Docker image	Key from the image build	Check the key	Own key in /ofbiz/config
24.09.08	Zip of 2 November 2026	Safe for the 46 CVEs	Still run step 5

The version data comes from the Apache OFBiz security page and the OFBiz download page. The 18.12 line stops at 18.12.19, and the security page says all releases before 24.09.08 are affected.

Rama Digital analysis: the official Docker image carries a security.token.key from the image build, so all servers from the same tag use the same value. The default value of security.internal.sso.enabled is false. Still set your own key, because a key inside a public image is not a secret.

Prerequisites

• SSH access to the OFBiz server, or access to the Docker host.
• A backup of the database and the /ofbiz/runtime volume or the runtime/ folder.
• A list of your plugins and code changes, if your OFBiz comes from zip or git.
• 1 laptop outside the office network to check access from the internet.
• An update window of 30 to 60 minutes. A restart stops logins and scheduled jobs for a short time.

Step 1: Check the OFBiz version on the server and from outside

Save this script as check-version-ofbiz.sh. The script reads the VERSION file, the login page footer, or a version that you type, then rates that version.

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Check the Apache OFBiz version for the 46 CVEs fixed in 24.09.08 (including CVE-2026-83542 and CVE-2026-82907).
# The script only reads. Use: bash check-version-ofbiz.sh <OFBiz folder>
#   or check from outside through the login page: bash check-version-ofbiz.sh https://erp.example.com
#   or type a version by hand: bash check-version-ofbiz.sh 24.09.05
set -u
SAFE=24.09.08

lower() { [ "$1" != "$2" ] && [ "$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$1" "$2" | sort -V | head -n 1)" = "$1" ]; }

rate() {
  local v=$1
  case "$v" in
    24.09.*) if lower "$v" $SAFE; then echo "VULNERABLE: update to $SAFE"; else echo "SAFE for the 46 CVEs of release $SAFE"; fi ;;
    18.12.*|17.*|16.*|13.*) echo "NO PATCH: old line with no new release, move to $SAFE" ;;
    "") echo "CHECK: version not readable" ;;
    *) echo "CHECK: version $v unknown" ;;
  esac
}

ARG=${1:-.}
case "$ARG" in
  http://*|https://*)
    URL=${ARG%/}/webtools/control/main
    CODE=$(curl -sk -o /tmp/ofbiz-login.$$ -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 15 "$URL")
    V=$(grep -A 3 'Release' /tmp/ofbiz-login.$$ 2>/dev/null | grep -oE '[0-9]{2}\.[0-9]{2}\.[0-9]{2}' | head -n 1)
    rm -f /tmp/ofbiz-login.$$
    echo "== Login page $URL: HTTP $CODE"
    [ "$CODE" = 200 ] && echo "  CHECK: the webtools login page is open from this machine"
    if [ -n "$V" ]; then echo "OFBiz $V: $(rate "$V")"; else echo "The footer shows no version. Check on the server with the OFBiz folder."; fi
    exit 0 ;;
  [0-9]*) echo "OFBiz $ARG: $(rate "$ARG")"; exit 0 ;;
esac

DIR=$ARG
[ -d "$DIR/framework" ] || { echo "Folder $DIR is not an OFBiz folder (no framework/)"; exit 1; }
echo "== Folder: $(cd "$DIR" && pwd)"
V=""
if [ -f "$DIR/VERSION" ]; then
  V=$(head -n 1 "$DIR/VERSION" | grep -oE '[0-9]{2}\.[0-9]{2}\.[0-9]{2}' | head -n 1)
  echo "VERSION: $(head -n 1 "$DIR/VERSION")"
elif [ -d "$DIR/.git" ]; then
  echo "git: $(git -C "$DIR" describe --tags --always 2>/dev/null) branch $(git -C "$DIR" rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD 2>/dev/null)"
fi
echo "OFBiz ${V:-?}: $(rate "$V")"

# Mark of release 24.09.08: the rotateSecretKeys task in build.gradle (for installs from source).
if [ -f "$DIR/build.gradle" ]; then
  if grep -q 'task rotateSecretKeys' "$DIR/build.gradle"; then echo "build.gradle: has rotateSecretKeys (mark of 24.09.08 or later)"
  else echo "build.gradle: no rotateSecretKeys (mark of a release before 24.09.08)"; fi
fi
[ -f "$DIR/docker-entrypoint.sh" ] && echo "Install: official Docker image. Update with image tag $SAFE."
if command -v java >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo "Java: $(java -version 2>&1 | head -n 1)"; fi

# On the server, in the OFBiz folder (Docker image: /ofbiz)
bash check-version-ofbiz.sh /opt/ofbiz
# From a laptop, through the login page footer
bash check-version-ofbiz.sh https://erp.example.com
# A version that you copied from another server
bash check-version-ofbiz.sh 24.09.05
# Manual check without the script
head -n 1 /opt/ofbiz/VERSION
docker exec ofbiz head -n 1 /ofbiz/VERSION

The OFBiz login page footer shows the release number with no login. So outsiders can also read your version.

Check the result: "VULNERABLE" or "NO PATCH" means go to steps 2 and 3 today. "SAFE" still means run step 5, because the flaws existed before you updated.

Step 2: Check open webapps, secret keys, and features

This step answers 3 questions: which back office apps open from the internet, whether the secret keys are still defaults, and which features have specific CVEs.

Save this script as check-exposure-ofbiz.sh. The script compares the SHA-256 hash of each key with the hash of the old default value, so the key values do not show.

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Check Apache OFBiz exposure: active webapps, access from outside, secret keys, and features with specific CVEs in release 24.09.08.
# The script only reads. Use: bash check-exposure-ofbiz.sh <OFBiz folder> [public URL, for example https://erp.example.com]
# Run the URL part from a machine outside the office network, for example a laptop on mobile data.
set -u
DIR=${1:?OFBiz folder}
URL=${2:-}
# SHA-256 hashes of the old default values. The script compares hashes, so the key values do not show.
OLD_TOKEN="2bfb2e4647a6d57fe34f11bb248095e6584d47047cb97fa0c4cf920be3a0874b 20c08f2cb64a05d8d72c77fc0bd4b5065ebd9bc5232fb11524f9eb57f013970c"
OLD_ADMIN=9b1dcb080aff9dd7346c624791f2dbdbb3062a04854633eeb3ad0a7da949326d
hash() { printf '%s' "$1" | sha256sum | cut -d ' ' -f 1; }
prop() { grep -E "^$2=" "$1" 2>/dev/null | tail -n 1 | cut -d = -f 2- | tr -d '\r'; }

echo "== 1. Active webapps"
APPS=$(for f in "$DIR"/framework/*/ofbiz-component.xml "$DIR"/applications/*/ofbiz-component.xml "$DIR"/plugins/*/ofbiz-component.xml; do
  [ -f "$f" ] || continue
  grep -q 'enabled="false"' "$f" && continue
  grep -oE 'mount-point="/[a-z-]+"' "$f" | cut -d / -f 2 | tr -d '"'
done | sort -u)
echo "  $(echo "$APPS" | wc -w) webapps: $(echo $APPS)" | fold -s -w 100

echo "== 2. Access from outside"
if [ -n "$URL" ]; then
  OPEN=""; CLOSED=""; COUNT=0
  for app in $APPS; do
    case "$app" in ecommerce|ecomseo|common-js|ordermgr-js|contentimages|images|iCalendar) continue ;; esac
    k=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 10 "${URL%/}/$app/control/main")
    COUNT=$((COUNT + 1))
    case "$k" in 200|401|302) OPEN="$OPEN /$app" ;; *) CLOSED="$CLOSED /$app=$k" ;; esac
  done
  echo "  Back office webapps that are OPEN: $(echo $OPEN | wc -w) of $COUNT"
  [ -n "$OPEN" ] && echo "   $OPEN" | fold -s -w 100
  [ -n "$CLOSED" ] && echo "  Closed (HTTP code):$CLOSED" | fold -s -w 100
else echo "  Skipped: no public URL given"; fi

echo "== 3. Secret keys"
SEC="$DIR/framework/security/config/security.properties"
[ -f "$DIR/config/security.properties" ] && SEC="$DIR/config/security.properties"
TK=$(prop "$SEC" security.token.key)
if [ -z "$TK" ]; then echo "  security.token.key: EMPTY. Run ./gradlew generateSecretKeys"
elif [[ " $OLD_TOKEN " == *" $(hash "$TK") "* ]]; then echo "  security.token.key: OLD DEFAULT (CVE-2026-105330). Run ./gradlew rotateSecretKeys"
elif [ -f "$DIR/docker-entrypoint.sh" ] && [ ! -f "$DIR/config/security.properties" ]; then echo "  security.token.key: CHECK, the key was made at Docker image build, not on your server"
else echo "  security.token.key: own key (${#TK} characters)"; fi
echo "  security.internal.sso.enabled=$(prop "$SEC" security.internal.sso.enabled) (file ${SEC#"$DIR"/})"
START=$(find "$DIR/framework/start" -name start.properties 2>/dev/null | head -n 1)
AK=$(prop "$START" ofbiz.admin.key); AH=$(prop "$START" ofbiz.admin.host)
if [ -n "$AK" ] && [ "$(hash "$AK")" = "$OLD_ADMIN" ]; then echo "  ofbiz.admin.key: OLD FIXED KEY (CVE-2026-97355)"; else echo "  ofbiz.admin.key: not the old fixed key"; fi
case "${AH:-127.0.0.1}" in 127.0.0.1|localhost) echo "  AdminServer: local only (${AH:-127.0.0.1}), port $(prop "$START" ofbiz.admin.port)" ;;
  *) echo "  AdminServer: OPEN on $AH" ;; esac

echo "== 4. Features with specific CVEs"
DS=$(grep -A 1 '<delegator name="default"' "$DIR/framework/entity/config/entityengine.xml" | grep -oE 'datasource-name="[^"]+"' | head -n 1 | cut -d '"' -f 2)
case "$DS" in *mysql*|*maria*) echo "  Database: $DS. CHECK: CVE-2026-81815 (SQL injection) applies" ;;
  *) echo "  Database: $DS. CVE-2026-81815 is only for MySQL and MariaDB" ;; esac
MT=$(prop "$DIR/framework/common/config/general.properties" multitenant)
[ "$MT" = Y ] && echo "  multitenant=Y. CHECK: CVE-2026-74841 and CVE-2026-84728 apply" || echo "  multitenant=${MT:-N}"
REST=$(find "$DIR" -name '*.rest.xml' -not -path '*/runtime/*' 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
echo "  REST files (.rest.xml): $REST. If more than 0, CVE-2026-92887 applies"
grep -q 'name="address" value="0.0.0.0"' "$DIR/framework/catalina/ofbiz-component.xml" && echo "  AJP: CHECK, the AJP port listens on all addresses" || echo "  AJP: local only"

# Run on the server. For part 2, also run it from a laptop outside the office network.
bash check-exposure-ofbiz.sh /opt/ofbiz https://erp.example.com

In image 24.09.07, ofbiz.admin.key is still the old fixed key (CVE-2026-97355). AdminServer listens on 127.0.0.1 by default, so this key is only a danger if you open port 10523 to the network.

Check the result: write down the number of OPEN back office apps, the security.token.key status, and the database type. An OPEN count above 0 from outside the office means apply step 4a today as well.

Step 3: Update to 24.09.08 and set new keys

The update is the only step that closes these 46 CVEs. Old secret keys stay valid after the update, so replace the keys in the same step.

3a. Official Docker image

# 3a. Official Docker image (tested with podman, the docker commands are the same)
docker pull ghcr.io/apache/ofbiz:24.09.08
docker stop -t 30 ofbiz && docker rm ofbiz
# Use the same volumes, env, and network as the old container
docker run -d --name ofbiz -p 127.0.0.1:8443:8443 \
  -v ofbiz-runtime:/ofbiz/runtime -v ofbiz-config:/ofbiz/config \
  ghcr.io/apache/ofbiz:24.09.08

In our test, the 24.09.08 container used the same runtime volume, did not load the data again, and the admin login with the old password still worked. Also read the OFBiz Docker guide.

3b. Copy security.properties again, then set your own key

# 3b. Only if /ofbiz/config/security.properties exists: copy it again from 24.09.08, then set your own key
docker exec ofbiz cp /ofbiz/framework/security/config/security.properties /ofbiz/config/security.properties
docker exec ofbiz sh -c 'sed -i "s#^security.token.key=.*#security.token.key=$(head -c 48 /dev/urandom | base64 -w 0)#" /ofbiz/config/security.properties'
docker restart -t 30 ofbiz

In our test, the copy from 24.09.07 lacked 2 properties that 24.09.08 has: allowFilePaths and webtools.datafile.url.allowed.hosts. The old copy hides the new file, so the new settings of this release stay off until you copy the file again.

3c. Install from zip or git

# 3c. Install from zip or git: download and check SHA-512
curl -O https://downloads.apache.org/ofbiz/apache-ofbiz-24.09.08.zip
curl -O https://downloads.apache.org/ofbiz/apache-ofbiz-24.09.08.zip.sha512
[ "$(sha512sum apache-ofbiz-24.09.08.zip | cut -d ' ' -f 1)" = "$(cut -d : -f 2 apache-ofbiz-24.09.08.zip.sha512 | tr -d ' \n' | tr A-F a-f)" ] && echo SHA512 MATCH
unzip -q apache-ofbiz-24.09.08.zip && cd apache-ofbiz-24.09.08
# A zip folder with no .git makes gradlew fail with the message "No hooks found"
git init -q .
# Move your plugins, configuration, and data to the new folder, then build (not tested)
./gradlew build
# Required if your security.properties comes from a release before 24.09.06 (CVE-2026-105330)
./gradlew rotateSecretKeys

According to the CVE-2026-105330 record, the update alone does not replace a key that is already set. Installs that carry security.properties from a release before 24.09.06 must run ./gradlew rotateSecretKeys. This task makes a new JWT key, so all old tokens stop working.

In our test in the eclipse-temurin:17-jdk image, the SHA-512 check matched. ./gradlew failed with no .git folder. After git init, generateSecretKeys filled the empty key, and rotateSecretKeys replaced that key.

We did not test the build and the data migration from zip, because those steps depend on your plugins and database.

3d. Change the admin password and check accounts

The Docker image uses the default admin password from its documentation if the OFBIZ_ADMIN_PASSWORD variable is empty at the first start. Change the admin password, remove unused accounts, and remove back office permissions from partner accounts that do not need them.

Check the result: the version script prints "SAFE for the 46 CVEs", the footer shows 24.09.08, and the exposure script prints "own key" and "not the old fixed key".

Step 4: Reduce the impact until the update is done

This step reduces the impact, but it does not make the server safe. Valid accounts can still use the flaws that need a login.

Rama Digital analysis: the Apache announcement gives only the update as a mitigation. We chose 2 temporary steps. Condition: the update cannot run today, or the server still uses 18.12. Limit: valid accounts can still use the flaws that need a login.

4a. Close the back office from the internet at the reverse proxy

# Step 4a: close the OFBiz back office from the internet in nginx. Replace 203.0.113.0/24 with your office or VPN IP.
# Test: nginx 1.29 in front of OFBiz on port 8088. On your server, put these 2 location blocks in your existing 443 server.
server {
    listen 8088;
    # Public shop pages (ecommerce plugin). Remove this block if only staff use OFBiz.
    location ~ ^/(ecommerce|images|common-js)(/|$) {
        proxy_pass https://127.0.0.1:8443;
        proxy_set_header Host $host;
    }
    # All other paths, including webtools, partymgr, sfa, and rest: only from the office or VPN IP.
    location / {
        allow 203.0.113.0/24;
        deny all;
        proxy_pass https://127.0.0.1:8443;
        proxy_set_header Host $host;
    }
}

This rule denies all paths except the public shop pages. In our test, a path with a semicolon parameter such as /webtools;x was also denied, because the location / block catches all other paths.

If only staff use OFBiz, remove the ecommerce block and allow only the office or VPN IP. Also close ports 8080 and 8443 at the firewall, so that OFBiz can only be reached through the proxy.

4b. Set your own security.token.key

# 4b. Docker image: put a security.properties with your own key in the /ofbiz/config volume
cp /ofbiz/framework/security/config/security.properties /ofbiz/config/security.properties
sed -i "s#^security.token.key=.*#security.token.key=$(head -c 48 /dev/urandom | base64 -w 0)#" /ofbiz/config/security.properties
# Restart the container so OFBiz reads the new key. Old login sessions and password reset tokens stop working.

This step replaces the JWT key in a Docker image. It does not close other flaws, so still run step 3.

Check the result: from a laptop outside the office, the exposure script prints "OPEN: 0", and part 3 prints "own key".

Step 5: Look for signs of use

These flaws existed before you updated, so also look for signs from before the update.

Save this script as check-signs-ofbiz.sh. The script looks for advisory parameters and webtools tools in the access logs, render errors in ofbiz.log, and new files in the OFBiz folder.

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Look for signs that the OFBiz flaws of release 24.09.08 were used, in the logs and the OFBiz folder. The script only reads.
# Use: bash check-signs-ofbiz.sh <OFBiz folder> <since YYYY-MM-DD>
# Reverse proxy logs (nginx, Apache) can also be checked: bash check-signs-ofbiz.sh <folder> <date> /var/log/nginx
set -u
DIR=${1:?OFBiz folder}
SINCE=${2:?start date, for example 2026-10-01}
LOGDIR=${3:-$DIR/runtime/logs}
SIGNS=0; CHECKS=0
sign() { echo "  SIGN: $1"; SIGNS=$((SIGNS + 1)); }
check() { echo "  CHECK: $1"; CHECKS=$((CHECKS + 1)); }
access() { find "$LOGDIR" -type f \( -name 'access_log*' -o -name 'access.log*' \) -newermt "$SINCE" 2>/dev/null | sort; }
search() { access | xargs -r zgrep -hE "$1" 2>/dev/null; }

echo "== 1. Access logs ($LOGDIR, since $SINCE)"
echo "  $(access | wc -l) access log files"
while IFS= read -r l; do sign "parameter from the advisory: ${l:0:150}"; done < <(search '_LAST_VIEW_NAME_|mainDecoratorLocation|=file(:|%3[aA])')
while IFS= read -r l; do check "webtools tool: ${l:0:150}"; done < <(search '/webtools/control/(xmldsdump|viewdatafile|EntitySQLProcessor|ProgramExport|EntityImport)')
while IFS= read -r l; do check "SFA portal POST: ${l:0:150}"; done < <(search '"POST /sfa/control/editPortalPage')
IPKEY=$(search 'externalLoginKey=' | awk '{print $1}' | sort -u | tr '\n' ' ')
[ -n "$IPKEY" ] && check "externalLoginKey in the URL from IPs: $IPKEY(compare with office IPs)"

echo "== 2. Errors in ofbiz.log and error.log"
for f in "$LOGDIR"/ofbiz.log* "$LOGDIR"/error.log*; do
  [ -f "$f" ] || continue
  zgrep -hE 'Error rendering screen \[file:|groovy\.lang\.|MissingPropertyException|SecuredUpload|JWT .*(invalid|fail)' "$f" 2>/dev/null | tail -n 5 |
    while IFS= read -r l; do echo "  CHECK: ${l:0:150}"; done
done
N2=$(cat "$LOGDIR"/ofbiz.log* "$LOGDIR"/error.log* 2>/dev/null | grep -cE 'Error rendering screen \[file:|groovy\.lang\.|MissingPropertyException|SecuredUpload|JWT .*(invalid|fail)')
CHECKS=$((CHECKS + N2))

echo "== 3. New or changed files in the OFBiz folder, outside runtime"
while IFS= read -r f; do
  rel=${f#"$DIR"/}
  case "$rel" in *.jsp|*.jspx|*.war) sign "new server file: $rel" ;; *) check "changed: $rel" ;; esac
done < <(find "$DIR" -path "$DIR/runtime" -prune -o -path "$DIR/.git" -prune -o -type f -newermt "$SINCE" \
  \( -name '*.jsp' -o -name '*.jspx' -o -name '*.war' -o -name '*.groovy' -o -name '*.ftl' -o -name '*.xml' -o -name '*.properties' -o -name '*.jar' \) -print 2>/dev/null | head -n 20)

echo "== Result: SIGNS $SIGNS, CHECKS $CHECKS"
[ "$SIGNS" -gt 0 ] && echo "Keep the logs as evidence, cut access from the internet, then follow step 5 in the article."
exit 0

bash check-signs-ofbiz.sh /opt/ofbiz 2026-10-01
# nginx logs in front of OFBiz
bash check-signs-ofbiz.sh /opt/ofbiz 2026-10-01 /var/log/nginx

In our test, 1 CHECK is the security.properties file that we changed ourselves in step 3b. Compare every CHECK with the change notes of your team.

Many attacks use POST, and access logs do not keep the POST body. So also check the accounts in the database with these queries. We tested these queries in the webtools SQL Processor on the built-in Derby database of the image.

-- Accounts created or changed since 1 October 2026
SELECT USER_LOGIN_ID, CREATED_STAMP, LAST_UPDATED_STAMP FROM USER_LOGIN
 WHERE LAST_UPDATED_STAMP > '2026-10-01 00:00:00' ORDER BY LAST_UPDATED_STAMP DESC;
-- Accounts in the full admin groups
SELECT USER_LOGIN_ID, GROUP_ID, FROM_DATE FROM USER_LOGIN_SECURITY_GROUP
 WHERE GROUP_ID IN ('FULLADMIN', 'SUPER') ORDER BY FROM_DATE DESC;

Check the result: the script prints "SIGNS 0", every CHECK has an explanation, and the queries show no admin account that you do not know. Attackers can delete logs, so 0 signs does not prove that the server is safe.

If you find even 1 sign, keep the logs and a database backup as evidence. Then cut back office access from the internet, replace all passwords and keys, and rebuild the server from a clean 24.09.08 release.

If OFBiz keeps customer or staff data, Indonesian Law 27/2022 on Personal Data Protection requires a written notice within 3 times 24 hours after a personal data breach. Also read the WordPress core CVE-2026-119977 warning.

Example: 1 morning of response for 3 OFBiz servers

This simulation uses dummy data. The server names, times, and results are not customer data.

Time (WIB)	Dummy server	What was checked	Result	Action
08.00	erp-warehouse (Docker 24.09.07)	Steps 1 and 2	VULNERABLE, 15 back office apps open	Step 4a now, update this afternoon
08.30	erp-main (zip 24.09.03, MySQL)	Steps 1 and 2	VULNERABLE, old default JWT key	Update, then rotateSecretKeys
09.00	erp-legacy (18.12.16, VPN only)	Steps 1 and 2	NO PATCH, 0 open from outside	Plan a move to 24.09.08
09.30	erp-warehouse	Step 5	SIGNS 1: new .jsp file	Keep evidence, replace keys, rebuild

The lesson from the simulation: a safe version does not prove that the server is clean. Step 5 is still needed on every server.

Who installs the patch

OFBiz runs on your server, so your hosting provider does not install this patch for you.

Service type	Patch owner	What you do
OFBiz on a VPS or your own server	Your team	Steps 1 to 5
OFBiz on Docker or Kubernetes	Your team	Change the image tag, copy the configuration again, then step 5
ERP built by an integrator on OFBiz	The integrator, as the contract says	Ask for written proof of the version and the results of steps 2 and 5
OFBiz on a managed hosting service	The provider, as the contract says	Ask for the update date and the step 5 result

Rama Digital recommendation: put the back office behind a VPN, update web apps on a fixed schedule, and watch the security releases of every framework that you use, for example the Rails Active Storage CVE-2026-122006 warning.

Checklist for today

1. List all OFBiz servers, including staging. Owner: IT team. Evidence: a list of names and versions.
2. Check the version with step 1. Owner: IT team. Evidence: script output.
3. Check exposure from outside the office with step 2. Owner: IT team. Evidence: script output.
4. Apply step 4a on every server that cannot update today. Owner: IT team. Evidence: exposure script output.
5. Update to 24.09.08 and set new keys. Owner: IT team or integrator. Evidence: script output after the update.
6. Change the admin password and clean up accounts. Owner: business owner and IT team. Evidence: a list of active accounts.
7. Look for signs with step 5. Owner: IT team and security team. Evidence: script and query output.

Questions and answers

Have these flaws been used in attacks?

On 6 November 2026, we found no attack reports, and these 46 CVEs are not on CISA KEV. But 3 earlier OFBiz flaws went on KEV, so update today.

My OFBiz only opens through a VPN. Am I safe?

The risk from the internet is much smaller. Still update, because 23 code execution and access CVEs can be used by valid staff or partner accounts.

I still use 18.12. What do I do?

The 18.12 line gets no new release. Apply step 4a today, then plan a move to 24.09.08.

Does the Docker update delete my data?

No, if you use the same volume for /ofbiz/runtime. In our test, the data and the admin login stayed after the image change. Still make a backup before the update.

Why must I copy security.properties again?

The copy in /ofbiz/config hides the file from the new image. In our test, the old copy lacked 2 properties from 24.09.08.

Does rotateSecretKeys log users out?

Yes. This task makes a new JWT key, so old tokens, including password reset tokens, stop working. Run it in the update window.

Do the check scripts change anything on my server?

No. The 3 scripts only read. The commands that change something are only in steps 3 and 4, and each command is written separately.

Next steps

Limits that still apply: step 4 does not replace the update, and the update does not undo data that already leaked. If your OFBiz server shows signs in step 5, or you need help with the update and an audit, use Vibe Code Rescue. For 1 urgent problem today, book a 30-minute session.

Sources

• Apache OFBiz CVE announcement: the list of 46 CVEs, affected versions, and the official mitigation, 4 November 2026.
• Apache OFBiz security page: affected versions and the PR number of each CVE.
• release notes for 24.09.08: the list of security fixes in 24.09.08.
• OFBiz download page: release 24.09.08 and the list of 18.12 releases.
• CVE-2026-83542 record and CVE-2026-82907 record: official descriptions, CWE, and the CISA ADP score of 9.8.
• CVE-2026-105330 record: the old JWT key condition and the rotateSecretKeys task.
• official OFBiz Docker image and OFBiz Docker guide: image tags, volumes, and start variables.
• CISA KEV: status on 6 November 2026 and the 3 earlier OFBiz flaws.
• Indonesian Law 27/2022 on Personal Data Protection: the duty to report a personal data breach.